Finally, some brief responses to the kind observations on my book by the three respondents, with a view to possible improvements of the model I have proposed. I began the outline of my analytical model by confronting it with that of Teubner, as mentioned in the response of Willem Witteveen. As Witteveen states, it is my goal and ambition to replace the flow model of communication (Teubner) with something new. Witteveen maintains that Teubner has already discarded the flow model of (...) communication. However, even Witteveen acknowledges (along with many others) that in the autopoiesis theory Teubner developed a one-sided communication model: that of the flow of legal rules between different social subsystems. The legal system is one such social subsystem, rule addressees are other social subsystems. Teubner’s model of legal messages concentrates basically on legal rules which aim to produce factual results in the form of behaviour conforming to the rules. The flow of legal messages takes pl .. (shrink)

Developed from a one-day symposium at the University of Tilburg, this collection of papers explores the semiotic foundations of legislation as viewed from jurisprudential, institutional and sociological perspectives. They pose such questions as: the audience of legislation; the relations between legislative and judicial discourse; the contributions of speech act theory; the effectiveness of legislation and its meaning in non-legal discourse; and the creation of a supra-national form of constitutional discourse, that of Europe.

Is guidance by social norms compatible with rationality? Jon Elster has argued inThe Cement of Societythat there is a fundamental contrast between rationality and conformity to social norms. The context of study is the problem of collective action, with special emphasis on collective wage bargaining. In such negotiations, the appeal to social norms rather than to self-interest can block agreement. Suppose one union is committed to the norm of equal pay for equal work; another one appeals to the norm of (...) equal pay for everybody, regardless of the type of work. ‘In the presence of competing norms that favor different groups, the self-righteousness conferred by belief in a norm can lead to a bargaining impasse.'In confrontations between individuals, codes of honor can produce similar problems. It is in no one's interest to face a colleague over the barrel of a gun because one has made a nasty remark about his latest book, but if the code demands that one fight it out, the challenge must be accepted. (shrink)

Over the last few decades there have been several calls for a “big picture” of the history of science. There is a general need for a concise overview of the rise of modern science, with a clear structure allowing for a rough division into periods. This essay proposes such a scheme, one that is both elementary and comprehensive. It focuses on four machines, which can be seen to have mediated between science and society during successive periods of time: the clock, (...) the balance, the steam engine, and the computer. Following an extended developmental phase, each of these machines came to play a highly visible role in Western societies, both socially and economically. Each of these machines, moreover, was used as a powerful resource for the understanding of both inorganic and organic nature. More specifically, their metaphorical use helped to construe and refine some key concepts that would play a prominent role in such understanding. In each case the key concept would at some point be considered to represent the ultimate building block of reality. Finally, in a refined form, each of these machines would eventually make its entry in scientific research, thereby strengthening the ties between these machines and nature. (shrink)

This article develops a model first proposed in my book Jurisprudence and communication [67]. It takes as its starting point the generally conception that legal rules are valid norms, involving a normative content and expressing themselves in reality through observable conduct. This dualistic character of law is central. Law is both fiction and factual, ideal and real. But the viewpoint that a legal rule is a manifestation of validity in reality, through empirical acts, raises the question how rules as (valid) (...) fictions can be known and understood in their linguistic form. How is meaning attributed to the legal words and how do these words relate to the world of fact? Taking an institutional-pragmatic approach as a starting point, an analytical model is created that can be used as an instrument for the relationship between legal rules as thought objects existing only in the mind, and legal rules as observable conduct. This model seeks to revise the classical models of legal communication that basically focus on the unilateral flow of legal information between ‘senders and receivers’ and their claim of linear causality between rules and conduct. The model here constructed in the theoretical part is then applied to several case studies, in order to analyze the construction of meaning in actual use. Two fundamental rights—the older codified in 1798 and the more recent codified in 1983—in the Dutch Constitution have been analyzed using the model as an instrument. Further, the remarkable shifts in article 96 of the Constitution, the declaration of war, and its consequences, resulting in a new category of war—the armed conflict—have been analyzed, as well as the phenomenon of ‘peacekeeping missions’ involving actual warfare. The new war terminology has created vagueness with respect to the clear-cut division between war and peace, which has been reflected in several cases before Court, including the Eric O. case. The present analysis of the case studies indicates that the model was not in all cases completely tailored to the facts: for example, in the case study on article 96 a broad spectrum of observable legal and non-legal actors dominated the facts in such a way that the model did not fully cover it. The observations on my book by the three respondents in this special issue have contributed to the adaptation and extension of the model. In the Postscript my responses suggest some ways in which their ideas can be implemented. (shrink)

Some conspicuous characteristics of argumentation as we all know this phenomenon from our shared everyday experiences are in my view vital to its theoretical treatment because they should have methodological consequences for the way in which argumentation research is conducted. To start with, argumentation is in the first place a communicative act complex, which is realized by making functional verbal communicative moves.

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year their landmark works The Uses of Argument and La nouvelle rhétorique. The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman’s inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars (...) in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned. (shrink)

How do Dutch people let each other know that they disagree? What do they say when they want to resolve their difference of opinion by way of an argumentative discussion? In what way do they convey that they are convinced by each other’s argumentation? How do they criticize each other’s argumentative moves? Which words and expressions do they use in these endeavors? By answering these questions this short essay provides a brief inventory of the language of argumentation in Dutch.

In institutional legal theory, norms and facts are reciprocally operating elements: an interplay in which meaning construction is closely connected with acting: the pragmatic understanding of legal language in terms of its uses. With the semiotic elements of institutional theory, extended by the notion of ‘semiotic groups’, an analytical framework can be constructed to analyze a case study on the shifts in the concept of war which have taken place since the 1945 UN Charter and in the aftermath of 9/11. (...) The semiotic aspects of the institutional approach can offer insight into the complexity of the processes of meaning attribution in the field of law and war. (shrink)